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Rhythm-Sense-Subject, or: 
The Dynamic Un/Enfolding of Sense 
 




This article traces Henri Meschonnic's concerted attempts to grasp the interaction rhythm-
sense-subject, and situates this with the broader concerns of his work: the critique of ‘sign-
thinking’, the elaboration of rhythm as le continu, his reflection on historical subjectivity. 
Meschonnic’s thinking of rhythm is of an exigency from which he himself often shrinks back, 
notably through a series of equivocations (between language and sense, between rhythm as such 
and an individual rhythmic figure, between discourse as activity and an individual’s 
discourse/idiom). The article focuses on these equivocations, and argues that within them we 
come to see the complexity, and mutability, of the rhythm-sense-subject interaction. It ends by 
proposing that we think the place of rhythm in this interaction in terms not of 






Where, then, to start with rhythm? Can one ever ‘start’? For with rhythm, everything is surely 
always already underway; it is only when underway that rhythm can be said to be, only when 
underway that can emerge the repetitions, the recursions, of rhythmed time. When rhythm is 
sensed, it is sensed retroactively—we sense that there has already been rhythm. Only 
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retroactively does rhythm indicate its work of configuration. Where, then, to start? For if rhythm 
is underway, it is always a case of a ‘then’—not in the sense of a demonstrative that would 
indicate a particular moment when we start, or when rhythm starts, a degree zero of rhythm as 
it were, but in the sense of a conjunction of inference: ‘then’ implies an anteriority, at once 
temporal and logical, which discloses itself as ‘rhythmic’, indeed upon which rhythm itself 
depends; when we encounter rhythm, what we encounter is in part its anteriority, its already 
having unfolded, within which we are already enfolded. But such conjunction also reiterates 
rhythm’s constitutive relationality, a relationality which unfolds, enfolds, in time. ‘Rhythmic 
becoming’, Maurice Blanchot was moved to write, is ‘le mouvement pur des relations’ (‘the 
pure movement of relations’);1 or, on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s terms, rhythm is 
fundamentally medial, an ‘entre-deux' (‘in-between’) which facilitates a 'passage transcodé d'un 
milieu à un autre, communication de milieux, coordination d'espace-temps hétérogènes’ (‘a 
transcoded passage from one milieu to another, communication of milieus,  cordination of 
heterogeneous space-times’)2 This is rhythm as ‘syntagmatics’, as Meschonnic will call it,3 
setting in relation different orders of sense, of movement. And yet, the temporality of rhythm 
is not of forward propulsion only: ‘then’ syncopates back also, prosodically, syntactically, 
rhythmic continuities scored by discontinuity. If we are already underway in rhythm, then the 
time of rhythm is multidirectional, heterogeneous, internally plural, subject to intensions, 
extensions, distensions; it is a time that is not only sensed but is cognised, and indeed, given its 
recursions, its enfoldings, is cognised only through being re-cognised. But where, then? For it 
would appear that we are always ‘in’ rhythm, as we orient ourselves, are configured, in sense. 
When we start with rhythm, we are—in part, at least—trying to get to where we already are. 
The question of rhythm is thus, from the start, also a question of sense: rhythm is something 
sensed, something that appears in sense, but is also sense-giving, sense-making. And rhythm is 
also a question of subject—of the ‘we’ who are oriented in sense, who have been configured in 
and by rhythm, who are subjects of, and subject to, rhythm, sense. And this is before we start 
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to differentiate between two meanings of rhythm, between a generalised rhythmicity and 
individual rhythmic figures, let alone differentiate between alternative modes of rhythmicity, 
alternative domains for rhythmic figures: prosodic, musical, choreographic, but also circadian, 
physiological, societal; and all this before we start disaggregating the different senses of ‘sense’: 
corporeal, linguistic, directional.4 
No thinker has followed the ramifications of the various reciprocal interrelations of rhythm, 
sense, subject, in as concerted a manner as Meschonnic. He recognises, in particular, that their 
interrelation deprives one of an easy starting point: 
 
Ni la théorie du rythme, ni la théorie du sens, ni celle du sujet ne sont constituées. Mais 
jamais aucune théorie n’est constituée. L’erreur initiale serait d’attendre, pour l’une, 
que l’autre soit plus assurée. Aucune des trois n’est un préalable à l’autre. Sauf à 
attendre indéfiniment. Si le sens, le sujet, le rythme sont liés, travailler à l’un c’est les 
travailler ensemble. (Critique 78)  
(Neither the theory of rhythm, nor the theory of sense, nor that of the subject are 
constituted. But no theory is ever constituted. The initial mistake would be to wait for 
one to be more defined before the other can be further determined. None of the three is 
a prerequisite for the others. Or there would be an indefinite wait. If sense, subject, 
rhythm are linked, working on one means working them together.) 
 
In this predicament lies, one might say, the economy of Meschonnic’s thinking, continually 
holding in suspense rhythm, sense, subject, restlessly working and re-working them in different 
permutations, according to different shapes of interaction (equivalence, identity, subordination, 
synecdoche…). An economy characterised by disequilibrium and nonmeasure, attending to 
rhythms irreducible to, and in excess of, any ‘metric’. But not an economy merely: what 
emerges is something like a method: if each term or category (rhythm, sense, subject) is bound 
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to the others in dynamic reciprocity, if none can be invoked in isolation, then this demands a 
thinking of the ‘continuous’ (le continu) where habitually thinking has in Western metaphysics 
operated through discontinuity, through prising apart, isolating, breaking down into constituent 
parts its objects of thought (as befitting a history built on ana-lysis, whose original connotations 
of loosening, releasing, dissolving, would furnish an epistemological principle). To attempt to 
think rhythm is to find oneself in a hermeneutic circle, in which rhythm, sense, and subject, are 
already there, even if not theoretically ‘constituted’, mutually dependent, coterminous, even 
consubstantial. A hermeneutic circle also shaped by the history of the conceptualisation of 
rhythm, sense, subject, which, in being bound to ‘la paradigmatique du signe’ (‘the 
paradigmatics of the sign’)—which, ‘pas seulement un modèle du langage, c’est également, et 
indissociablement, un modèle anthropologique, philosophique, théologique, social et politique’ 
(‘not only a model of language, but also, and indissociably, an anthropological, philosophical, 
theological, social and political model’), would obstruct any attempt to orient oneself in this 
circle (Pour Sortir, 15). 
All of which might explain, in Meschonnic, the apparent circularity in thinking, as it beats 
itself endlessly against the limits of this circle. Meschonnic has won few friends for his written 
style—not least his propensity to invective, long lamented by those sympathetic to his work5—
but one can see how this writing embodies both the economy and method of his thought. One 
result of his insistence to think these categories in their ‘reciprocal interaction and implication’ 
is that no category ever gets treated in its particularity; following on from this comes the 
continual escalation of one problem into a chain of ever increasing vastness. Even the most 
apparently manageable category slips from our grasp, and we are left with a repeated injunction 
to think, but little indication of how such thinking might proceed. Whence an impression of 
deadlock, in which need is countermanded by impossibility. It is enough to make even the most 
resolute reader lose heart.  
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Meschonnic is hardly the first thinker to find themselves in such a predicament. As Hegel 
saw it, the idea that one might grasp the tools of cognition before embarking on cognition was 
tantamount to learning to swim without ever entering the water;6  and in Being and Time 
Heidegger argued that Dasein was always-already ‘thrown’ into its being-in-the-world, and so 
could not get purchase on being as an object of thought.7 Yet for each, it transpired that the task 
was not to extricate ourselves from this predicament, but rather to recalibrate our thinking in 
relation to it: as Heidegger put it, the exigency of the hermeneutic circle was not to ‘get out of 
the circle, but to come into it in the right way’.8 Hegel could thus observe that the attempt to 
grasp the tools of cognition simply was cognition, so that in learning to swim (to follow his 
analogy), we are, even perhaps without knowing it, already in fact swimming, or at least 
splashing about and staying somehow afloat; for Heidegger (whom Meschonnic never would 
cease to excoriate, and to whom he dedicated two book-length polemics, Le Langage Heidegger 
and Heidegger ou le national-essentialisme9), just to recognise the circle as ‘hermeneutic’ 
confronted one with the fact of the meaning of being, and more than this, the fact that being is. 
The situatedness of thinking becomes both the predicament of thinking, and what is to be 
thought.  
At work here is a double anteriority: the historical constitution of this situatedness, and its 
ontological conditions. Meschonnic too provides a history of this situatedness, notably in his 
critique of the sign, and its ascendancy in Western thought which renders alternative 
conceptions of language ‘unthinkable’. But what of the second, ontological, anteriority? This 
is certainly intimated in his account of what is at stake in his ‘critique of rhythm’, where he 
writes: ‘la critique doit être théorie du sens, et de ce qui, dans le sens, déborde le sens, où agit 
le rythme’ (‘the critique (of rhythm) must be a theory of sense, and of that which, within sense, 
overflows sense, where rhythm is acting’) (Critique, 60).10 The critique of rhythm, that is, seeks 
to grasp excesses of, and over, sense: not just breakdowns but also surfeits of sense, points at 
which different modalities of sense are at work alongside and against one another. Rhythm thus 
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exposes us to an outside, and a before, of sense. And when he writes that ‘Rhythm is not sense, 
… but sense material, even the material of sense’ (83), are we to conclude that rhythm provides 
a substrate for sense? Might rhythm provide an ontological first term? 
There is ambiguity in Meschonnic’s syntax here: if the critique of rhythm requires both a 
theory of sense and a theory of ‘that which, within sense, overflows sense’, then where precisely 
is rhythm at work—in sense, or in its overflow? That the final clause should read almost like 
an afterthought does not help matters, though Meschonnic’s ambiguity is salutary—and not just 
because a theory of sense must surely also be a theory of what exceeds and withdraws from 
sense. If rhythm ‘is acting’ within sense, then is the implication that it works to overflow sense, 
or that it works within an overflow immanent to sense itself? Moreover, is this overflow 
rhythmic, or generated by rhythm? Or should we understand from this that rhythm does not 
simply inhabit sense, but stands at the threshold of sense, at once exceeding sense and 
configuring this excess? Or might we, finally, identify rhythm as the self-overflowing 
movement of sense itself, opening up a horizon that, sensual, sensible, semantic, answers to the 
diverse senses of ‘sense’? Where Meschonnic vacillates is precisely where the aporia of rhythm 
is most pronounced: both sensed and sense-making, and yet exceeding, preceding, sense. 
For a thinker who so often proceeds through categorical assertion, such vacillations are 
surprisingly common. It is tempting to read these as symptoms of conceptual inconsistency; yet 
in the following I will read them back into what I have characterised as Meschonnic’s economy 
of thinking; such equivocations may be the point at which Meschonnic's own claims collapse 
under their own weight, but they stem from the difficulty of the task he had set himself—and 
more than this, might trace those disequilibria released in the interaction of rhythm-sense-




One passage from the Critique du rythme is particularly glaring for its equivocations. Given 
that the problem of grasping the rhythm-sense-subject relation is a problem of anteriority, it is 
appropriate that it should come in a reflection on the ‘anteriority of rhythm’. Meschonnic starts 
by terming rhythm ‘un représentant non sémiotique du sujet qui est antérieur du sens’ [‘a non-
semiotic representing of the subject which is anterior to sense’] (99), where again the final 
conjunction (this time ‘qui’, rather than ‘où’) at first appears to specify, but in fact makes 
matters more confused. Does ‘qui’ refer to the subject, so that the subject is anterior to sense? 
Or to rhythm as ‘non-semiotic representing’? Earlier, Meschonnic had claimed that sense is 
‘l’activité d’un sujet’ (‘the activity of a subject’) (71). ‘Activity’, stemming from Humboldt’s 
energeia, stands in opposition to ‘product’ (ergon), as though to suggest that sense is something 
we do, rather than something we make. But it also implies that sense is enacted by subjects, that 
it emerges from out of subjective activity. Earlier it seemed that rhythm offered an ontological 
first term, as material substrate for sense; now it appears to be the subject which stands as the 
first term. 
He then continues: 
 
L’antériorité du rythme sur le sens des mots est indissociable de ces mots, même si le 
rythme fait sens autrement, partiellement. Étant du discours, il n’est pas antérieur au 
discours particulier où il est un autre du sens. S’il y a une antériorité du rythme, elle 
précède le sens des mots, mais non les mots eux-mêmes. Antériorité seulement par 
rapport à la priorité habituelle du sens. 
(The anteriority of rhythm over the sense of the words is indissociable from these 
words, even if rhythm makes sense otherwise, partially. Being of discourse, it is not 
anterior to the particular discourse where it is other of sense. If there is an anteriority 
of rhythm, it precedes the sense of words, but not the words themselves. Anteriority 
only in relation to the habitual priority of sense.) (99)  
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In the reduction of ‘sense’ to ‘the sense of the words’, Meschonnic contravenes his own 
insistence on the polysemy of sens; when he depicts rhythm as ‘other of sense’, his claim is that 
its modes of sense-making are irreducible to signification, but has his entire argument not been 
that sense itself is irreducible to signification? It seems that this expanded definition of sens as 
incorporating all sense-making phenomenal activity has become too vertiginously open to bear. 
Similarly, the question of rhythmic anteriority is no longer posed in terms of a sense-material 
anterior to sense, but in the more circumscribed context of its anteriority over ‘le sens des mots’ 
(‘the sense of the words’). So he shrinks back, construing ‘sense’ to mean ‘the sense of the 
words’, and thus linguistic reference along the model of the sign. And, shrinking back, he 
reverts to his well-worn critique of sign-thinking, whose ‘habitual priority of sense’ is grounded 
on a reduced, impoverished understanding of sense itself. But this was not the problem he had 
set himself. Turning to a straw man sens serves as a means of avoiding the problem of 
anteriority as such, that problem that so haunts the nexus rhythm-sense-subject. 
This points to a more fundamental difficulty with Meschonnic’s understanding of sens. It 
seems axiomatic in Meschonnic that ‘sense’ belongs to language (langage): again, not as the 
langue of structural linguistics with its system of lexis-grammar-syntax, and for which rhythm 
would be akin to ‘form’ as opposed to ‘content’, ‘sound’ as opposed to ‘sense’, but as 
‘discourse’, where rhythm permeates the entire ‘situation’ of utterance, binds together the total 
semantics of sense-making activity.  
But here, a further slippage: Meschonnic situates the anteriority of rhythm within ‘the 
particular discourse’. One might take from this that, where rhythm is concerned, we must think 
in terms of ‘particulars’ rather than abstractions; and yet the discourse he presents here is one 
quite removed from his model of discourse in general. It employs sense as signification, for a 
start. This is discourse as idiolect, rather than as dialogical activity. The turn to the particular 
brings not concretion but equivocation. In one gesture, he posits rhythm as the production of a 
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sense that makes sense ‘otherwise’ within discourse—through prosody, inflection, intonation—
and excludes such sense-making from what he now appears to be terming ‘sense’. How to 
square this use of ‘sense’ with his later statement that ‘comme tout est sens dans le langage, 
dans le discours, le sens est générateur de rythme, autant que le rythme est générateur de sens, 
tous deux inséparables--un groupe rythmique est un groupe de sens’ (‘as everything in 
language, in discourse, is sense, sense is generator of rhythm, as much as rhythm is generator 
of sense, both inseparable—a rhythmic group is a group of sense’) (215)? For here, there is a 
reversibility of sense and rhythm, where each is ‘generator’ of the other, which further unsettles 
the claim that rhythm necessarily takes place within the horizon of discourse. But in this later 
claim we find what is becoming a characteristic equivocation, between the term as such and its 
concrete instantiation, between rhythm as process of dynamic configuration, and the ‘rhythmic 
group’, an individual figure. 
What is emerging in each case, is that Meschonnic conceives of all rhythm as linguistic 
rhythm, albeit with a markedly capacious model of language. This is what underpins his 
recurrent definition of rhythm as ‘l’organisation du sens dans le discours’ (‘the organisation of 
sense in discourse’) (71). It is a gesture at once liberating, and restricting. On the one hand, it 
allows rhythm to incorporate an array of linguistic rhythms that are not exclusively prosodic, 
let alone metrical, such as when in ‘The Rhythm Party Manifesto’ he will call rhythm 
‘l’organisation-langage du continu dont nous sommes faits’ (‘the language-organisation of the 
continuum of which we are made’). 11  Rhythm, on this account, does not simply bind 
phonological units together into prosodic phrases, but binds humans together within discourse. 
In this, Meschonnic follows Benveniste in foregrounding the phrase over the phonological unit: 
phrasing is always discursive, and cannot be reduced to its grammatical or morphological 
status.12 Metre as a conceptual model reduces rhythm to periodicity, isochrony, to the ordering 
of discontinuous syllables: discontinuous both in that they are isolated from each other, and as 
they are isolated from sense. They are subsequently measured into feet, or verse lines, 
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formalised according to patterns of alternating stress and unstress, and then reconstructed into 
higher level units. By contrast, ‘Le rhythme est continu-discontinu. Il est un passage, le passage 
du sujet dans le langage, le passage du sens, et plutôt de la signifiance, du faire sens, dans 
chaque élément du discours, jusqu'à chaque consonne, chaque voyelle’ (‘Rhythm is continuous-
discontinuous. It is a passage, the passage of the subject in language, the passage of meaning, 
and rather signifiance, sense-making, in every element of discourse, right up to each consonant, 
each vowel’) (225).  
If langue reduces rhythm to alternating stress and unstress, the rhythms of discourse bind 
speakers and elements of discourse into a relation. Continuous-discontinuous, it is both jointure 
and articulation, setting up linkages and commonalities, but in the same gesture individuating 
rhythmic elements. To set into relation necessarily entails such a double movement. In his later 
writings, Meschonnic will grasp rhythm solely as ‘the continuous’: indeed, even when the 
Critique du rythme treats rhythm as ‘continuous-discontinuous’, it is clear that the continuous 
already predominates, insofar as rhythm shapes the passage between continuous and 
discontinuous, thus indicating a higher order continuity. Rhythm here acts as the binding power 
of language: as it binds subjects in language, as it binds language together into a discursive 
whole—binding linguistic elements together, binding us to language, binding us through 
language, but also binding language to its outside, to that which exceeds language. ‘Le rythme 
du discours est une synthèse de tous les éléments du discours, y compris la situation, l'émetteur, 
le récepteur. Il est ce qui inclut l'extralinguistique et l'infralinguistique dans le linguistique’ 
(‘The rhythm of discourse is a synthesis of all the elements of discourse, including the situation, 
the speaker, the listener [émetteur, récepteur]. It is what includes the extralinguistic and the 
infralinguistic in the linguistic’) (225). 
To this extent, the gesture is liberating; but it is restrictive, also, as it occludes that other 
array of rhythms which are not linguistic—even in this expanded understanding of language—
but which nevertheless ‘make sense’. Meschonnic appears to dismiss these non-linguistic 
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rhythms wholesale as belonging to ‘metre’. This too might be traced back to Beneveniste’s 
account of ruthmos, and its particular variation on the theme of Plato’s-original-sin: the Platonic 
ruthmos, unlike uses of the term which preceded it, is ‘associated with metron and bound by 
the law of numbers… which presupposes a continuous activity broken by metre into alternating 
intervals.’13 In the examples Benveniste gives, Plato uses ruthmos specifically in reference to 
music and dance; it would seem that Meschonnic takes this to mean that all musical rhythm 
accords with an interpretation of ruthmos as metron. This model of rhythm-as-metre is then, he 
argues, applied onto the stress patterns of a language from outside.14  
In studies of versification, a qualitative distinction is often made between linguistic stress 
and unstress on the one hand, and musical beat and off-beat on the other;15 Meschonnic’s 
implication is that the notion of relative stress in phonology is itself a derivation of the beat/off-
beat opposition (187). Whereas the rhythm of discourse binds the continuous and the 
discontinuous, in metre non-linguistic rhythms, projected onto phonology, break such rhythmic 
jointure up into discontinuous units, erasing the ‘passage’ between units which, for 
Meschonnic, subtends their rhythmic relationality. It is one thing to say that this is imported 
from musical theory; it is quite another to say that it is imported from musical practice. 
Meschonnic neglects to reflect on the complexity of the musical phrase, let alone ask whether 
the rhythms of music and dance might themselves possess a multidirectionality and 
heterogeneity that operates outside the confines of the ‘measure’.16  
Perhaps Meschonnic would consider musicologists’ talk of ‘tonal’ or ‘harmonic’ language 
to be analogical at best, catachresis at worst; and yet such ‘languages’ would, just as much as 
any poem, work through discursive idiom and ‘serial semantics’, and would point to ‘sense’ as 
a meaningful-corporeal matrix—albeit with no recourse to signifiers. Meschonnic expands 
language outwards, from langue to discourse; other modes of artistic expressivity might suggest 
expanding discourse further outwards to non-verbal sense-making activity. But instead, 
Meschonnic ties sense back to verbal discourse: this not only returns the problematic of rhythm 
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to linguistic rhythm alone, but subordinates all other rhythms to the linguistic. This despite the 
fact that the earlier uses of ruthmos that Benveniste cites were largely unconnected to language, 
describing rather the ways that diverse phenomena provisionally take form, disclose themselves 
in movement.17 
We have seen two equivocations, ostensibly shifts from abstract to concrete, even (though 
Meschonnic would resist the terms) ontological to ontic, but which introduce distortions as they 
shift from one to the other: of sense to ‘the sense of the words’, and of discourse to ‘a 
discourse’.18 Writes Meschonnic: ‘Si le sens est un activité du sujet, si le rythme est une 
organisation du sens dans le discours, le rythme est nécessairement une organisation ou 
configuration du sujet dans son discours’ (‘If sense is the activity of a subject, if rhythm is an 
organisation of sense in discourse, rhythm is necessarily the organisation or configuration of 
the subject in its discourse’) (71). When rhythm is described as the organisation/configuration 
of the subject in its discourse (that is, a particular discourse which is the possession of a 
particular subject, as opposed to discourse as such), this raises two problems. Where rhythm 
had previously been grasped as the configuration of sense, now it is the marker of a subject in 
language: sense is reduced to discourse, and discourse to personal idiom, ‘its discourse’.  
Yet there is another vacillation here, with even greater ramifications for Meschonnic’s 
broader economy, and method. The phrase ‘configuration of the subject’ can read as either 
subjective or objective genitive: either the subject is configured through rhythm, or the subject 
configures rhythm. This finds an echo in Politique du rythme, politique du sujet, where 
Meschonnic argues for a model of ‘le rythme dans le langage […] comme l’organisation du 
mouvement dans la parole, l’organisation d’un discours par un sujet et d’un sujet par son 
discours’ (‘rhythm in language (…) as the organisation of movement in speech, the organisation 
of a discourse by a subject and of a subject by its discourse’).19 In both instances, rhythm 
appears in ‘a discourse’ that belongs to ‘a subject’.  
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Meschonnic’s initial assertion that the three domains, sense, subject, and rhythm, were 
epistemologically coterminous, has now fragmented: sense into discourse and then a discourse; 
rhythm from configuration/organisation as such to the reciprocal organisation of a subject and 
its discourse. Here again, it would seem that the subject has become the ontological first term, 
such as in the claim that ‘le langage est un élément du sujet, l’élément le plus subjectif, dont le 
plus subjectif à son tour est le rythme’ (‘language is an element of the subject, the most 
subjective element, whose most subjective element in turn is rhythm’) (Critique, 71). Which 
leaves the question: what, or who, is this subject? And also—keeping with the rigorous 
reversibility between a subject and its discourse that Meschonnic observes—in what way are 
they a subject of rhythm, in what way subject to rhythm? 
Both subject of and subject to. The subject is habitually taken to be the site of agency, 
interiority, consciousness, able to act upon objects, able to cognise objects of knowledge; and 
yet immanent in the word itself is a tension that pervades what it is to be subject. To be ‘subject’ 
implies the condition of being ‘subjected’ (soumis, assujetti), as much as it does the claim to 
subjecthood. So how is it that subject should come to signify something like the opposite of 
subjection, and what kinds of subjecthood issue from this? Or as Meschonnic puts it, how can 
the ‘valeur passive’ [passive value] of being ‘subjected’ become ‘la base et la constante d’une 
stabilité’ [‘the basis and the constant of a stability’]? In phrasing the question thus, Meschonnic 
is interested in the process of ‘subjectivation’ itself (Politique, 198); for Meschonnic grasps the 
subject as ‘une activité, non un support (hupokeimenon, sub-jectum) de cette activité’ (‘an 
activity, not a support (hupokeimenon, sub-jectum) of this activity’) (Pour sortir, 142). Sense 
is an ‘activity of a subject’, and the subject is itself ‘activity’.  
But on how this activity operates, Meschonnic is less certain. In Politique du rhythme, 
politique du sujet (1995), he offers the following definition: ‘Est sujet celui qui travaille la 
tension initiale, fondatrice du sujet, son ambiguïté, transformant la statique du sujet assujetti en 
sujet de lui-même’ (‘Subject is the one who works the initial, foundational tension of the 
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subject, its ambiguity, transforming the static of the subjected subject into a subject of itself’) 
(Politique, 200). This implies a teleology: subjectivation as the eventual attaining of 
subjecthood (the basis and constant of a stability). And yet in Pour sortir du postmoderne enfin 
(2009) he suggests an alternative relation: ‘Sujet au sens de celui qui supporte, qui est soumis 
à. Qui porte en lui. Puis à la réflexion, le sujet c’est la réversibilité entre les deux’ (‘Subject in 
the sense of that which sustains, which is subjected to something. Which carries in itself. Then 
reflected back, the subject is the reversibility between the two’) (125). In other words, less 
teleology than continual oscillation. 
There is a certain irony in seeing Meschonnic, elaborating the different meanings of 
‘subject’, engage in such etymological speculation. He is a thinker little credulous of ‘l’emploi 
réaliste-essentialiste du langage, ce mélange d’origine-essence-vérité pris pour le sens, et qui 
développe, chaque fois qu’il veut rendre compte d’un mot, son étymologie’ (‘the realist-
essentialist employment of language, that mix of origin-essence-truth taken for meaning, and 
which develops, each time that it wants to take account of a word, its etymology’) (Pour sortir, 
169). Etymological speculation constitutes, he argues, a reification of ‘nomenclature’; it 
confuses the history of a lexeme with its discursive historicity ‘comme tension et activité 
continuée’ (‘as tension and continual activity’) (15). Even Benveniste’s treatment of the notion 
of ruthmos as found in pre-Socratic thought, so crucial for Meschonnic’s project, is found 
wanting: Benveniste, having discovered a meaning of ruthmos as ‘la forme dans l'instant qu'elle 
est assumé par ce qui est mouvant, mobile, fluide’ (‘the form in the instant that it is assumed by 
what is moving, mobile and fluid’),20 ‘s’arrête à son travail philologique’ (‘restricts himself to 
his philological work’), rather than opening on to a philosophical-poetic elaboration of its 
consequences—namely of grasping its ramifications for thinking rhythm as continuum, as 
dynamic configuration (Politique, 142). Essentialist play on etymology mistakes historical 
antecedence for metaphysical origin; philological analyses of a set of cognates (ruthmos, 
schema, metron) tail off, just as critical-conceptual work begins. 
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Meschonnic never explains why his elaboration of the tension inherent in the word ‘subject’ 
does not fall under such essentialism; perhaps it is because this tension is not posited as a reified 
origin, but rather experienced continually in the double-binds of subjectivation each time that a 
‘subject’ constitutes itself. It would thus be part of the lived history of the subject. This history 
of the subject is further marked by its epistemological and ideological confusions—of which 
the most prevalent is the conflation of subject and individual. The term ‘subject’ habitually 
elides the differences between several categories: ‘subject’ (as opposed to object); ‘individual’ 
(as opposed to collective); ‘self’ (as opposed to other); interiority (as opposed to exteriority). 
Following Manfred Frank, Meschonnic suggests that ‘subject’ signifies a universal, ‘person’ a 
particular, and ‘individual’ a singularity (Politique, 191).21 But if the subject is ‘universal’, it 
follows a peculiar universality: on the one hand, the subject is ‘un universel linguistique 
ahistorique: il y a toujours eu sujet, partout où il y a eu langage’ (‘an ahistorical linguistic 
universal: there has always been a subject, everywhere where there has been language’) 
(Critique, 72); on the other, the subject in discourse is the motor of history, and as such 
constitutes historicity itself, understood as ‘la faculté indéfinie de présence au présent, de 
transformation de tous les présents’ (‘the indefinite faculty for presence in the present, for 
transformation of all presents’) (Pour sortir, 18). As the subject pluralises itself in history, it 
attains this status as ‘ahistorical linguistic universal.’ 
The category of ‘subject’ might thus be seen as working across different axes: grammatical, 
numerical, legal, spatial. Might these accord with the plural conceptualisations of the subject 
itself? There is the ‘conscient, unitaire, volontaire’ (‘conscious, unitary, intentional’) 
philosophical-psychological subject (16), which would inhabit a grammatical position (bearing 
predicates, acting upon objects); there is the subject which ‘manifeste pour ses droits’ 
(‘struggles for its legal rights’) (136); the moral subject would seem both individuated by its 
moral conscience and subject to a moral law; the aesthetic subject too would seem to be 
characterised by its individuality and its interior experience. To reduce these all to one single 
 16 
subject would be to overlook the radical heterogeneity that lies in the interstices of these various 
subjects. ‘On ne saurait réduire ces divers sujets à des variantes du sujet philosophique. Ce ne 
sont pas des essences réelles. Ils correspondent à des activités distinctes’ (‘One could not reduce 
these diverse subjects to variants of the philosophical subject. These are not real essences. They 
correspond to distinct activities’) (136).  
Elsewhere Meschonnic invokes ‘la treize à la douzaine des sujets que nous sommes’ (‘the 
baker’s dozen of subjects which we are’) ('Manifeste', 292); if this might be starting to resemble 
an Occam’s razor of subjects, one should recall the insistence that the subject is not a ‘real 
essence’ but rather discloses itself plurally, in and as these ‘distinct activities’. If the subject is 
a ‘universal’, its universality would not offer a model of selfhood, but rather resemble the 
personal pronoun I: as Benveniste puts it, I refers to ‘la personne qui énonce la présente instance 
de discours contenant je’ (‘the person who utters the present instance of discourse containing 
I’), and as such is radically impersonal, transferrable from one subject to another, but also 
situating them as subject in discourse.22 Or as Meschonnic puts it, ‘le je passe de je en je et reste 
je’ (‘the I passes from I to I and remains I’). Subjectivity is a position we inhabit rather than a 
property we possess. Moreover, this position is radically relational: ‘entre je et tu, intérieur et 
extérieur à la fois. Object, mais de lui-même, comme sujet de l’autre’ (‘between I and you, 
interior and exterior at the same time. Object, but of itself, as subject of the other’) (Politique, 
209).  
This is not to map a linguistic ‘subject’ on to the grammatical-logical place of the subject in 
a proposition (again: bearing predicates, acting upon an object); rather, for Meschonnic 
subjectivity emerges out of the act of enunciation. The question of how the first person pronoun 
works is not just a question of what is meant by ‘subject’, but also what is meant by ‘language’. 
For the model of language as langue, ‘le sujet parlant ne peut avoir qu’une définition 
grammaticale’ (‘the speaking subject can only have a grammatical definition’) (Critique, 70): 
the subject of la langue is a transcendent subject of knowledge and domination, the subject-
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individual but also the individualist subject. By contrast, the subject of le langage, subject of/to 
discourse, distributed amongst so many different utterances of I, is constitutively plural, 
incomplete, an activity among others within discourse rather than the basis, or support, of a 
singular agency. ‘L’individu-sujet’ (‘subject-individual’) is ‘la créature des systèmes de signes’ 
(‘the creature of sign systems’) (71-72); the subject of discourse would exceed not only the 
notion of the sign but also individuality. But if the subject is to be thus distinguished from the 
‘individual’, Meschonnic will also argue: ‘Le sujet est l’individuation: le travail qui fait que le 
social devient l’individuel, et que l’individu peut, fragmentairement, indéfiniment, accéder au 
statut du sujet, qui ne peut être que historique, et social’ (‘The subject is individuation: the work 
through which the social becomes individual, and the individual can, fragmentarily, 
indefinitely, reach the status of subject, which can only be historical, and social’) (95).  
The subject is defined by its rhythmics: it binds together heterogeneities in dynamic 
configuration. This would anticipate his claim, years later, that ‘le rythme est un forme-sujet. 
Le forme-sujet’ (‘rhythm is a subject-form(er). The subject-form(er)’) ('Manifeste', 295). By 
forme-sujet Meschonnic brings together both the particular form that a subject takes with that 
which gives form to a subject, that through which a subject is formed. Again, subject and rhythm 
are conceived according to a certain reversibility, where each is always-already bound up with, 
even in, the other, where each reciprocally configures the other. 
But with this rhythmics comes further entanglement. The subject, Meschonnic states, is 
individuation; and yet it is through individuation that the individual reaches the status of subject, 
here seen as necessarily social, and, inversely through individuation that the social becomes 
individual. The individual, it appears, both antecedes individuation and is its endpoint; the 
subject is both equated with the process of individuation itself, and posited as the ‘status’ to 
which individuation will lead the individual. Moreover, the subject is necessarily historical, and 
Meschonnic also claims that the individual is a particular historical manifestation of the subject, 
and more specifically, as we have seen, ‘the creature of sign systems.’ But most arresting is the 
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intimation that, becoming subject, the individual becomes constitutively plural. Every subject 
is, he says, ‘trans-subject’ (Critique, 72). 
Might this apply not just to the individual person, but to other forms of individuality? Where 
Meschonnic slips from rhythm-as-such to the individual rhythmic figure, from discourse-as-
such to an individual discourse or idiom, from sense-as-such to the sense of words, what is lost 
is precisely this plurality. All of which stand in marked contrast to what he calls ‘the subject of 
the poem'—a subject which, Meschonnic is at pains to point out, is not to be confused with the 
subjectivity of the poet. Rather, this is the poem as subject, the subject as generated out of ‘the 
activity of the poem’ (Politique, 129), and which as such ‘déborde incommensurablement 
l’intention, la conscience’ (‘overflows incommensurably intention, consciousness’) (Pour 
sortir, 18): 
 
En entendant par poème tout récitatif du continu dans le langage comme inventio d’un 
système de discours par un sujet—le sujet du poème—et invention de ce sujet par son 
discours, soit en vers soit en prose… 
(Understanding by ‘poem’ any recitative of the continuous in language as invention of 
a system of discourse by a subject—the subject of the poem—and invention of this 
subject by/through its discourse, be it in verse or prose…) (Pour sortir, 137) 
 
Meschonnic’s notion of récitatif brings together the récit of storytelling with the réciter of oral 
recitation, along with the operatic tradition of recitative, overlapping sung speech with spoken 
song. It is a song which belongs not to speaker, but to speech: ‘the récit du langage’, 
Meschonnic stipulates, language reciting itself (Politique, 190). Again, it pertains to the 
individual discourse of the individual poem; again, we find that characteristic equivocation, this 
time in the apparently innocuous preposition par. Meschonnic can be glossed as saying: through 
inventing this discourse, the poem invents itself as subject; but also as saying: the subject is 
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invented by its discourse (or perhaps, by the poem’s discourse). On the former account, 
subjectivity is a form of self-invention through discourse, whereas the latter account would 
suggest a reversibility between subject and discourse, whereby each invents the other. 
‘Dans le poème, c’est la subjectivation du langage qui est sujet. À lire allégoriquement’ (‘In 
the poem, it is the subjectivation of language that is subject. To be read allegorically’), 
Meschonnic writes (191). Again, that characteristic double-genitive: language makes subject 
and is made subject. But how to read this ‘allegorically’? If poetry is ‘une subjectivation 
maximale du langage’ (‘a maximal subjectivation of language’) (79), this implies that poetry is 
but a more concentrated instance of a process found in all language. In which case, the 
subjectivation that takes place in the poem becomes exemplary for all subjectivation in/of 
language. But more than this: that the poem renders manifest this subjectivation of language, 
and thereby becomes an allegory for this subjectivation. This is subsequently taken up in ‘The 
Rhythm Party Manifesto’, where he intones: ‘Pas de sujet sans sujet du poème’ (‘No subject 
without the subject of the poem’) (292). If the subject of the poem denotes the kind of 
subjectivity that arises through linguistic making, then it concerns not merely works we would 
habitually class as ‘poetry’, but all human sense-making activity in which language is 
transformed: a sense-making activity that shapes the future parameters of sense-making. 
Might this subject of the poem cast further light on what Meschonnic means when he 
describes sense as ‘the activity of the subject’? The poem is not a product of an individual 
subject, but rather the activity of subjectivation through which a particular subject, distinct from 
the poet, emerges, along with the particularity of the poem’s discourse. It is through sense-
making that the subject emerges; which is to say: sense is subjectivation. And if rhythm is ‘the 
forme-sujet’, then rhythm is not only the dynamic configuration that subjectivation takes, but 
also that which gives shape to such subjectivation. Rhythm becomes the dynamic shaping of 
sense, as it unfolds, enfolds, as it is sensed, but also as it exceeds sense. As Meschonnic puts it, 
‘Le rythme, conçu dans une continuité avec le sens et le sujet, désunit le sens, le sujet’ 
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(‘Rhythm, conceived in continuity with sense and the subject, disunites sense, subject’) 
(Critique, 82). The question of rhythm thus brings us to confront the internal plurality of sense 
and subject, along with rhythm’s own pluralisations. Again, jointure, but also differentiation. 
Meschonnic’s major insight is that the rhythmic configuration of sense, subject, is both a 
binding of sense and subject—binding sense to itself, subject to itself, as well as sense to 
subject, subject to sense—and an unravelling of sense and subject as unities. But his thought 
continually shrinks back from this insight, either through his tirades against sign-thinking, 
where the exactitudes of thinking rhythm give way to reiterated statements of enmity, or where, 
faced with the protean, multiform phenomena of rhythm, sense, subject, eliding the wellworn 
categorical distinctions of universal/particular, abstract/concrete, ontological/ontic, 
Meschonnic equivocates. Whilst it is possible to reconstruct Meschonnic’s theory of rhythms 
as an interlinked set of attitudes, of stances, rallying cries, even dogmas, its equivocations mean 
it will never become a coherent system: for all the talk of ‘theory’ and ‘critique’, ultimately 
Meschonnic furnishes neither. But the equivocations within Meschonnic’s thinking allow us to 
see what is, as he puts it, ‘at stake in the critique of rhythm’, in the reciprocal interaction of 
rhythm, sense, subject. When Meschonnic thematises rhythm as ‘continuous-discontinuous’, as 
a setting-into-relation that is at once jointure and differentiation, he grasps the paradoxical 
interplay of incompatible movements, but the plane remains binary (just as for all his railing 
against the binaries of sign-thinking, he himself is not just binaristic but manichean). To think 
rhythm requires the interaction of plural planes, releasing multiple movements, and multiple 
topologies through which to trace these movements. When I have spoken of the dynamic 
unfolding, and enfolding, of sense, organised not around continuity but the 'fold', it is as an 
attempt to envision a spatiotemporal complex that allows for alternate kinds of orders of space 
and time, different modalities of spatial, and temporal, relation. In such unfoldings, in such 
infolds, one might situate the dynamics not just of sense-making but of subjectivation, the 
dynamics through and in which emerge subjects of rhythm who are—from the start, and 
 21 
ceaselessly—subject to rhythm. To think rhythm with Meschonnic, but beyond Meschonnic, I 
propose we attempt grasp this unfolding/enfolding, that we subject our thinking to their 
modalities, their configurations, their dynamics. 
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